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I. INTRODUCTION
We are all familiar with the old axiom that if it walks and talks like a
duck it probably is a duck. While far from scientific, this common sense
rule of thumb rings true time and again. But what if the creature walks and
talks like a duck, a deer, a cow, and a person? Cute phrases fall us when
complexity is introduced. All we are left with are difficult questions and
often troubling answers.
A lively debate in labor law has developed around the question of how
the law, and more specifically the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA")
should treat increasingly unwieldy bargaining groups. Recent history has
seen labor movements forming in heretofore-unforeseen places.1 Graduate
' B.A. in Economic 1999, Siena College; J.D. 2002, University of Pennsylvania Law
School. The author would like to thank Maria Corsaro for her assistance in developing the
thesis; Patrick Gartland, Matthew Shaw and Alex Diaz-Matos for assistance throughout the
research and writing process, and the editorial staff of the Journal, whose hard work
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1. At UCLA, a group of athletes explored the prospects of forming a labor union. See
Darryl Richards, Student-Athletes Unite!, FOXsports.com, (Jan. 19, 2001), available at
http:/www.foxsports.comlcolumns/stories/cfOll9richard.smil. Richards notes that college
athletics is "a big business where schools get millions to participate in major bowls and
coaches are paid $1 million a year to take them there. Schools make money on licensing
agreements and shoe contracts; the athletes don't see a dime." He goes on to explain "[t]he
UCLA students want better insurance in the off season, a bigger stipend and a chance to
earn more money during the academic year... the formation of a union at UCLA means
college athletics' sleeping giant is slowly waking up." This phenomenon has not been
limited to the popular press. One commentator has called for the formation of student-
athlete unions:
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level students at universities whose studies are supplemented by a
provision of services are, as a group, one example that has seen much
litigation. Are they students attempting to further their education and
preparation as teachers? Are they employees assisting professors and
faculty in the education of other students? Colloquially, is the student a
duck or not?
These are important issues, not just occasion to strike a pun, as each
affects the dilemma of whether or not to open collective bargaining to a
whole new class of "workers" while concurrently having a huge effect on
education. This is not purely an intellectual exercise; the National Labor
Relations Board ("NLRB" or "Board") has dealt with the topic extensively
and may have brought it to its legal end in 2000. The legal debate proved
contentious, with recent battles waged initially at both Yale University2 and
New York University,3 and taken to their logical conclusions in front of the
The arguments previously used to deny the employment status of Division I-A
scholarship athletes are no longer applicable. Today's scholarship athletes are
not primarily students, rather they are employees who receive compensation and
pay taxes in exchange for their services within the billion dollar industry known
as intercollegiate athletics.
At minimum, the National Labor Relations Board must create a new category of
student-employees. Scholarship athletes, by the nature of their employment, are
deserving of protection under the NLRA, as it is clear that the universities are
not interested in their best interests. As Charles Craypo discussed, "Unions and
collective bargaining are labor responses to the organization of production in a
market economy." Unfortunately, under the current system, it is the athletes
who generate the revenues, yet they receive the least in return.
Stephen L. Ukeiley, No Salary, No Union, No Collective Bargaining: Scholarship Athlete's
Are An Employer's Dream Come True, 6 SETON HALL J. SPORTS L. 167, 222 (1996)
(quoting CHARLES CRAYPO, THE ECONOMICS OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING: CASE STUDIES IN
THE PRIVATE SECTOR 2 (1986)). Adjunct professors have also moved to organize. A number
of regions across the country have seen adjunct professors make a move, including those at
New York University, Emerson College in Boston, and a number of California community
colleges. Steven Greenhouse, Graduate Students Push for Union Membership, N. Y. TIMES,
May 15, 2001, at A18.
2. David L. Gregory, The Problematic Employment Dynamics of Student Internships,
12 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 227, 245-49 (1998). In 1995, a group of Yale
graduate assistants held an election and voted in favor of union representation. Yale refused
recognition, claiming the relationship was not one of employment. The students responded
by withholding grades, but did keep up their other duties (including grading papers and
meeting with students). After the Board remanded the teaching assistant union's unfair
labor practice claims to an administrative law judge to determine whether or not the
teaching assistants were employees under the act, the two sides settled. Bernhard Wolfgang
Rohrbacher, Comment, After Boston Medical Center: Why Teaching Assistants Should Have
the Right to Bargain Collectively, 33 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 1849, 1849-50 (2000).
3. N.Y. Univ., 332 N.L.R.B. No. 111, Case 2-RC-22082, 2000 NLRB LEXIS 748
(Oct. 31, 2000).
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4
The NLRB's recent decision allowing New York University teaching
assistants-and therefore those of all private universities-to organize and
bargain as a unit with the University may have lessened the fervor of the
debate. Undoubtedly, many graduate students breathed a sigh of relief
(perhaps believing it long overdue) just as readily as school administrators
groaned in disbelief.
5
This decision was made possible by the NLRB's decision to forgo its
long held "primary purpose test"6 in classifying employees with a "service
test" in Boston Medical.7 By focusing on what a teaching assistant did
4. Hotbeds of teaching assistant unionization efforts includes the University of
Washington, where the Graduate Student Employee Action Coalition/United Auto Workers
(representing a majority of the school's 1600 teaching assistants) lead a strike in spring
2001. Ray Rivera, UW is Pressured to Settle Strike, SEATrLE TIMEs, June 7, 2001, at B2.
All told, some 15,000 graduate assistants belong to the UAW's graduate student union.
Rick Haglund, UAW's Future Lies Outside Auto Industry, THE GRAND RAPIDS PRESS, May
2, 2001. Columbia University has also seen a strong push, with the administration
predictably resistant. University President George Rupp describes the institution's stance:
"While we endorse the role of unions in representing employees.. .we do not consider it
appropriate for students who do some teaching or conduct research in the course of their
degree programs to be unionized." Amba Datta, U-Wire, New York Senators Support Union
Vote: Senators Clinton and Schumer Addressed Columbia's TA Issues (June 14, 2001), at
http://www.dallypennsylvanian.comlvnews/display.r/ART/2001/06/14/3b28cd750bd06?in_
archive+l. Yale's long running movement lead by the Graduate Employees and Students
Organization (GESO) received a boost last year but still faces strong administrative
resistance, and as yet has not been successful. "Collective bargaining is antithetical to my
idea of what a graduate education is all about," says Provost Alison Richard, a professor of
anthropology and mentor to at least thirty graduate students. "The process runs counter to
the notions of flexibility and individuality that are at the heart of graduate preparation here,
and it assumes a distinction between work and academic matters that in practice is difficult
or impossible to make." Bruce Felman, States of a Union, YALE ALUMNI MAG., Oct. 2001,
available at http:llww.yalealumnimagazine.comlissues/0l110/geso.html.
5. Examples of recent administration reaction to the move to unionization can be seen
in another Ivy League school. At the University of Pennsylvania, Deputy Provost Peter
Conn sent an e-mal to every graduate-level student in response to a union drive. After
informing the students that in his opinion, students are not employees and that they need not
sign the cards if they have reservations about the union, Mr. Conn closes the e-mall by
reminding the students that the student health insurance plan, one of the more controversial
topics among students on campus, is not a required element of the bargaining process. E-
mall from Peter Conn, Deputy Provost, The University of Pennsylvania, to Penn Graduate
Students (Oct. 16,2001).
6. See, e.g., St. Clare's Hosp. & Health Ctr., 229 N.L.R.B. 1000 (1977); Cedars-Sinai
Med. Ctr., 223 N.L.R.B. 251 (1976); The Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 214 N.L.R.B. 621
(1974); Adelphi Univ., 195 N.L.R.B. 639 (1972). The primary purpose test is explored in
depth below.
7. Rohrbacher uses the language "service test" in his article, and this language suits
the purposes of this paper. Rohrbacher, supra note 2, at 1851. The Board held in Boston
Medical only that Medical House Staff are employees because they provide compensated
services, but did not refer specifically to a "service test." Boston Med. Ctr. Corp., No. 30,
Case I-RC-20574, available at 1999 WL 1076118 (Nov. 26, 1999) (suggesting that persons
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rather than why they were doing it, the service test favors the teaching
assistants' cause, and led to the recent decision allowing New York
University graduate students to organize.'
This comment explores the NLRB's decision in New York University
and suggests that the line of decisions leading up to the opinion granting
students the right to organize is ill-conceived in its abandonment of the
primary purpose test and in the refusal to consider important policy
implications. The discussion begins with an exploration of the historical
underpinnings of the recent NLRB decisions regarding graduate students,
tracing the line of decisions that lead to the New York University ruling,
and then examines the policy issues the NLRB should have focused on
when considering this case.
II. THE BOARD'S JURISDICTION OVER PRIVATE UNIVERSITIES:
APPLYING THE NLRA To NEW INSTITUTIONS
Historically, the Board was hesitant to bring private universities under
the umbrella of the NLRA, but it later acquiesced, paving the way for New
York University.9 In the 1950 Columbia University'0 ruling, the NLRB
stated that without significant commercial activity and with an educational
focus, private universities can escape application of the NLRA. This brief
ruling fell short of barring application absolutely but suggested that
applying the act to private universities would not "effectuate the policies""
of the NLRA and NLRB even though the "activities of Columbia
University affect commerce sufficiently to satisfy the requirements of the
statute and the standards... for the normal exercise of its jurisdiction.
' '2
Where activities are distinctly "noncommercial in nature,"' 3 the Board
who perform services are employees, in spite of their other allegiances).
8. Boston Med. Ctr. Corp., at 1999 WL 1076118.
9. N.Y. Univ., 332 N.L.R.B. No. 111, Case 2-RC-22082, 2000 NLRB LEXIS 748
(Oct. 31, 2000). It is possible to view this development as a rejection of the Board
"protecting" certain institutions:
Labor law has seen a.. .turnaround. In a series of cases between 1970 and 1976,
the National Labor Relations Board repudiated the long-standing "worthy
cause" exemption that had shielded all nonprofits from federal labor law and
adopted a policy of treating nonprofit firms on the same terms as ordinary
business corporations.
Henry Hansmann, The Evolving Law of Nonprofit Organization: Do Current Trends Make
Good Policy?, 39 CASEW. RES. L. REv. 807, 817 (1988-89).
10. Trustees of Columbia Univ., 97 N.L.R.B. 424 (1951).
11. Id. at 425.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 426. Commentators have noted the power of this language. In a recent note,
Kenneth Brothers quotes Trustees of Columbia University:
Regardless of whether or not the conference report literally recites the Board's
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would withhold jurisdiction - reserving it for those cases with "exceptional
circumstances and in connection with purely commercial activities.
14
Still, as Hansmann notes, this language failed to influence future
Board decisions. "' Columbia was largely vacated (though not overturned)
by Cornell University,16 in which the Board extended the NLRA's reach to
private universities, citing modem education's tendency to blur the lines
between business, education, commercial, and non-commercial activities,
often in an effort to expand revenue streams or realize new economic
potential. The decision declares that the Board always had jurisdiction
over non-profit educational institutions yet declined to exercise it;
henceforth the Board will not decline to exercise jurisdiction over these
entities as a class. 17 The dividing line between "purely commercial [and]
noncommercial activity has not been easily defined."18 Now more than
ever, educational institutions act like businesses, 19 and though "[n]o claim
is made that education is not still the primary goal.. .to carry out its
[massive] functions, the university has become involved in a host of
activities which are commercial in [nature]." 20 Cornell met this new reality
head on, finding that private universities are indeed focused on and
motivated by educational goals, yet competition requires that to meet this
goal, universities must take part in increasingly commercial activities.
Included in the record was substantial testimony and data as to the finances,
practice prior to the amendment of the Act, it does indicate approval of and
reliance upon the Board's asserting jurisdiction over nonprofit organizations
"only in exceptional circumstances and in connection with purely commercial
activities of such organizations." Whether or not this language provides a
mandate, it certainly provides a guide.
Kenneth W. Brothers, Church-Affiliated Universities and Labor Board Jurisdiction: An
Unholy Union Between Church and State?, 56 GEO. WASH. L. Rav. 558, 563 n.23 (1988)
(quoting Trustees of Columbia Univ., 97 N.L.R.B. at 427).
14. Trustees Of Columbia Univ., 97 N.L.R.B. at 427 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 510, 80th
Cong., 1st Sess., at 32 (1947)). See also Henry Ford Trade Sch., 58 N.L.R.B. 1535
(1944)(applying the act to vocational schools serving industrial concerns); Polish Nat.
Alliance, 42 N.L.R.B. 1375 (1942) (applying the act to fraternal organizations acting as
insurers); Am. Med. Ass'n, 39 N.L.R.B. 385 (1942) (applying the act to an organization
publishing commercial magazines and pamphlets).
15. Hansmann, supra note 9, at 817.
16. 183 N.L.R.B. 329 (1970). -
17. Id. at331.
18. Id. See also Woods Hole Oceanographic Inst., 143 N.L.R.B. 568 (1963) (asserting
jurisdiction); but see Armour Research Found. of Ill. Inst. of Tech., 107 N.L.R.B. 1052
(1954) (declining jurisdiction).
19. Examples of schools dealing with the unique economic challenges they face today
are legion. For an example of one school's administration working to create new revenue
streams and expand their existing ones, see June Kronholz, College Green: For DePauw
University, a $128 Million Bequest Proves a Mixed Blessing, WALL ST. J., Mar. 8, 2001, at
Al.
20. Cornell Univ., 183 N.L.R.B. at 332.
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employment statistics, operating budgets and expenditures of major
universities, giving compelling evidence that Cornell had a substantial
effect on interstate commerce. This evidence, coupled with the
Congressional trend (affirmed judicially) towards granting non-profit
sector employees the same rights and privileges under the law as those in
the for-profit sector, factored heavily into the Board's thinking.2'
Arguments that universities are primarily local institutions were rejected
because non-profit work actions, like school strikes and hospital stoppages,
routinely impact interstate commerce. 22 That private universities have a
remarkably less significant effect on interstate commerce than public
universities did not diminish the impression made on the Board.23
Another interesting element of this case was the nod to increasing
levels of government involvement in higher education via federal aid and
student loans and the increasing union fervor on college campuses. Both of
these were cited by the NLRB as further reason to take an active role in
24private universities. 4 It is no wonder the Board took increasing levels of
aid into consideration; in the twelve years prior to this decision, three
separate acts authorized millions of dollars in federal aid for education. 5
III. ANIMAL, VEGETABLE OR MINERAL? AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
"PRIMARY PURPOSE" TEST
The so-called "primary purpose test" came to the fore in a series of
decisions in which the Board decided on the validity of a bargaining unit by
examining a plaintiff unit's primary purpose as a whole. If the primary
purpose of the unit is economic, then they can form a unit and bargain. If it
is instead primarily educational, and only secondarily economic, then it is
not a valid unit under the act.
26
The first case of import is Adelphi University.27 In this case, one
hundred graduate students who were also teaching assistants were denied
21. See Md. v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968).
22. Id. at 194-95.
23. Cornell Univ., 183 N.L.R.B. at 333.
24. Id. at 332-34.
25. Id. at 332 n.22.
26. The primary purpose test was relied upon by the NLRB but was construed widely in
various state courts. See Simmonds v. State Employees' Ret. Sys., 663 A.2d 304 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1995) (holding that a medical resident at a state hospital could receive credit
for time spent at the hospital despite the transitory nature of the work); Kapilian v. State
Employees' Ret. Sys., 600 A.2d 698 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1991), appeal denied, 608 A.2d 31
(Pa. 1992) (holding that a graduate student was not ineligible to purchase service credit for
work as a professor because state statutes did not distinguish between student and
instructor). Both decisions acknowledged the primary purpose test yet ruled on other legal
grounds.
27. 195 N.L.R.B. 639 (1972).
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the ability to bargain as a unit by the NLRB. The students were required to
devote twenty hours per week to their duties as assistants, for which they
were paid between $1200 and $2900 per academic year. The Board
distinguished then based primarily on economic benefits held by full time
faculty but denied to the teaching assistants, and secondarily on the fact
that full time faculty and professors oversee the educational progress of the
teaching assistants.2 The teaching assistants take part in this as a step
towards attaining a degree and have no hopes of advancing in position prior
to achieving that degree. Therefore, the Board found that the unit was
motivated by an educational purpose, not an economic one; the group in
question was made up of people who were primarily students and lacked a
"sufficient community of interest with the regular faculty" to warrant
inclusion in a unit.29 Professor Gregory explains:
In 1972, in Adelphi University, the NLRB held that graduate
assistants were "graduate students working toward their own
advanced academic degree, and that their employment depended
entirely on their continued status as such." The decision focused
on the students' primary interest in acquiring an education and
deemed the teaching to be incidental since it was "guided,
instructed, assisted and corrected."3 °
The NLRB used a similar analysis in the subsequent case Leland
Stanford Junior University.31 In that case, research assistants who were
also Ph.D. candidates were denied the right to form a unit to bargain
collectively with the university at which they were enrolled. The NLRB
noted that in addition to playing a role in the research process, the plaintiffs
were students and that the research performed by the assistants was often a
valuable aid in the academic process. Research can "prepare the student
for selection of a topic for a dissertation and serve as a trial period for both
the student and the faculty adviser to determine the student's interest and
ability."32 Also compelling was that faculty do not oversee the research
assistants on a day-to-day basis. Because assignments are centralized and
the assistants pursue their own academic interests, these assistants do not
constitute employees under the act. Allowing the students to work on a
variety of projects before choosing their dissertation topic provides the
opportunity to develop and hone new interests. Therefore, "all steps lead to
the thesis.
33
The analysis moved on to examine finances. All monies issued to
28. Id. at 640.
29. Id.
30. David L. Gregory, supra note 2, at 247-48, (quoting Adelphi, 195 N.L.R.B. at 640).
31. 214 N.L.R.B. 621 (1974).
32. Id. at 622.
33. Id.
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students are fixed, tax-exempt, and not linked to achievement; instead
stipends are in accord with the National Science Foundation Fellowship
and in many cases were lowered in proportion to the level of outside funds
received.34  Similar to the Adelphi decision, the Board noted that no
benefits were given to the research assistants, but that benefits were
awarded to full time faculty. Instead, the assistants share in the benefits
native to a traditional student.35
The Board did not limit the primary purpose test to cases involving
teaching or research assistants; instead, they applied it to almost any
situation where a student who also received monetary compensation hoped
to bargain collectively. Two examples are Cedars-Sinai Medical Center
36
and the affirming St. Clare's Hospital and Health Center.37 In Cedars-
Sinai, the Board was presented with a group of hospital interns 38 who
attempted to form a bargaining unit. The Board found that the unit was
similar to one of hospital employees, but failed to find proper justification
to classify the interns as employees. The decision turned on the fact that
the interns pursued these activities primarily for an academic purpose, to
earn a higher degree. Therefore, the relationship the internists had with the
hospital was not akin to an employer and employee but to a student and her
teacher. The internists, while "they possess certain employee
characteristics, are primarily students."39 Money received as a stipend was
viewed as a "scholarship for graduate study,''4 and interns were "to pursue
the graduate medical education that is a requirement for the practice of
medicine," not to earn a living. 1
Attached to this opinion was an influential dissent by Chairman
Fanning which criticized efforts to bar students from forming and joining
42bargaining units. He initially takes umbrage with the Board's insistence
that people who are "primarily students" cannot be "employees" within the
act. According to Chairman Fanning, in conceiving of student-employees
differently from regular employees, the Board misconstrued the intent of
the Act. The NLRA, section 2, subsection 3, refers to "any employee,- 43
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. 223 N.L.R.B. 251 (1976).
37. 229 N.L.R.B. 1000 (1977).
38. In this article "interns" refers to graduate level medical students working in a
private, nonprofit hospital.
39. Cedars-SinaiMed. Ctr., 223 N.L.R.B. at251.
40. Id. at 252.
41. Id. at 253.
42. Id. (Fanning, dissenting).
43. The cited section reads:
The term "employee" shall include any employee, and shall not be limited to the
employees of a particular employer, unless the Act [this subchapter] explicitly
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and the Chairman believed that such language dictates that the act be
applied liberally.44 The point that Chairman Fanning believes the Board
should take to heart is that even where the worker is 'primarily a
carpenter' or 'primarily a student,' [she] is nevertheless, an 'employee'
under the Act.
' 45
Chairman Fanning also took a curious step in examining the
etymology of the word "employee." "Employee," Chairman Fanning
argues, is derived from traditional notions of "servant., 46 The Chairman
argues that employees provide services and that this provision of services is
the primary factor in determining whether one is an employee or not.47 The
Chairman's analysis goes on to suggest that teaching and research
assistants provide valuable services to their schools, and therefore should
be considered employees. Leland Stanford is distinguished since the
plaintiffs in that case researched independently and served only themselves
and their own academic interests instead of those of the university.45
Chairman Fanning believed the stipend received for these services
(according to the record, often in excess of $20,000) offers further evidence
that these people are employees.49 Chairman Fanning also disputes the
majority's opinion that the income is non-taxable since it is paid in
exchange of services rendered.
50
St. Clare's Hospita5 1 followed closely on the heels of Cedars-Sinai
Medical Center, defending and clarifying the stance taken in Cedars-Sinai
by averring that the latter case was a decision about students overall and
52not healthcare in particular. Therefore, in the majority's view, it fits in
states otherwise, and shall include any individual whose work has ceased as a
consequence of, or in connection with, any current labor dispute or because of
any unfair labor practice, and who has not obtained any other regular and
substantially equivalent employment, but shall not include any individual
employed as an agricultural laborer, or in the domestic service of any family or
person at his home, or any individual employed by his parent or spouse, or any
individual having the status of an independent contractor, or any individual
employed as a supervisor, or any individual employed by an employer subject
to the Railway Labor Act [45 U.S.C. See. 151 et seq.], as amended from time to
time, or by any other person who is not an employer as herein defined.
National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (2001).
44. Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr., 223 N.L.R.B. at 254.
45. Id.
46. Id. See also Gerald M. Stevens, The Test of the Employment Relation, 38 MICH. L.
REv. 188, 189 (1939).
47. Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr., 223 N.L.R.B. at 255.
48. Id. at 255 n.14.
49. Obviously, cash has value; it appears that Chairman Fanning was moved more by
the size of the stipend than the mere existence of a cash payment.
50. Id. at 256 n.17.
51. 229 N.L.R.B. 1000 (1977).
52. Id.
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perfectly with national labor policy. The case is important for barring
students working in a non-academic manner for the university from which
they are to receive their degree from joining with non-students in a
bargaining unit.
St. Clare's defines four categories in which students attempting to
organize can be classified and explains the employee status of each class.
These four categories represent a spectrum, with employment entirely
unrelated to their studies on one end and the employee and student status
closely linked on the other.
The first category deals with students employed outside the university
working in a capacity in no way related to their scholarship. Only if the
students lack a common interest with non-student employees must the
Board consider a student-only bargaining unit.53
The second category consists of students employed by their university
in a capacity unrelated to their studies. In such a case, one's status as a
"student" is of minimal importance, affecting little more than hours of
employment. Just as in the first category, students can be viewed primarily
as employees, for developing a bargaining unit. 54
The third category is of students employed outside the university in a
capacity related to the student's course of study. In such a case, the
students are to be excluded from a unit of full-time, non-student employees
since the student's primary concern is educational, not economic, and
wages, hours, and conditions of employment are of minimal interest.5"
The final category is comprised of students who perform services for
their university that are directly related to their educational program,
exactly the situation the Board dealt with in St. Clare's. The Board had
traditionally denied collective bargaining to such students.
Working from this spectrum, the Board in St. Clare's concluded that
the primary relationship of the plaintiffs to the university was educational,
with employment only incidental to that goal.56 The Board was able to
make such a "fundamental distinction" because the mutual interests of the
students and the educational institution in the services being rendered are
predominantly academic. Such interests are completely foreign to the
normal employment relationship and "in the Board's view" not "readily
adaptable to the collective bargaining process.
57
The conclusion in St. Clare's is that the primary relationship of
plaintiffs to the university is educational, while employment is only
53. Id. at 1000-01.
54. Id. at 1001.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 1002.
57. Id.
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incidental to that goal . The Board took great care in making such a
"fundamental distinction for it [meant] that the mutual interests of the
students and the educational institution in the services being rendered are
predominantly academic rather than economic in nature. Such interests are
completely foreign to the normal employment relationship and [in the
Board's view] are not readily adaptable to the collective bargaining
process. 59
St. Clare's made clear the Board's position that any analogy between
student-teacher and employer-employee is clearly erroneous, and cemented
this view with the argument that "subjecting academic decision making to
collective bargaining is at best of dubious value because academic concerns
are largely irrelevant to wages, hours, and terms and conditions of
employment."60 In other words, the relationship developed in an academic
situation is unique to academia and differs greatly from the employer-
employee relationship. Emphasizing economic concerns over academic
ones frustrates the goals of academia.
This decision is not without its critics. Professor Jewett writes:
In addition to directly contradicting the professionals in-training
language of the NLRA, the Board's analysis relies on an outdated
model of professional mentoring. Its emphasis on the "personal"
relationship between instructor and student disregards the
economic realities of contemporary professional training, where
students must often undergo long apprenticeships or training
relationships in which they actually perform full professional
duties. In fact, the housestaff position represents the M.D.'s entry
into the world of medical employment as a doctor at the lowest
level. The NLRB's concern that collective bargaining would
undermine the "personal" nature of the student-teacher
relationship recalls the same paternalism that once granted
industrial employers greater power over employees. It was this
kind of bald power that the NLRA itself, in the form of the
Wagner Act, sought to diminish.6'
Professor Jewett's analysis fails to consider many of the pertinent
policy implications that the Board used in its decision.62
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Hilary Jewett, Professionals in the Healthcare Industry: A Reconsideration of
NLRA Coverage of Housestaff, 19 CARDOZO L. REv. 1125, 1141 (1997).
62. Eva M. Panchyshyn described some of these policy issues in a recent comment:
The Board cited a danger that collective bargaining may infringe on "traditional
academic freedoms," including the right to determine course length and content,
standards for advancement and graduation, and exams. Such topics might
become "bargainable" as wages, hours, and terms and conditions of
2002]
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It comes as no surprise that Chairman Fanning authored another
dissent in this decision criticizing most of the Board's reasoning. Fanning
disagreed most vehemently with the Board's suggestion that the decision
was steeped in any "'longstanding policy' which denies representation
rights completely to 'students' who are also 'employees' within the
meaning of Section 2(3). "63 Chairman Fanning points out a number of
cases the majority looked to for support and distinguishes them as not
actually turning on student status:
The first three cases, Giordano Lumber, Post Houses, and Crest
Wine, however, merely denied, respectively, one temporary
employee, several seasonal employees, and one casual
employee, inclusion in a broader unit with nonstudent employees.
In fact, in Giordano Lumber, three students were included in the
broader unit... because they were found not to be temporary
employees. Clearly, the fact that the excluded individuals were
students was essentially irrelevant. It was their temporary,
seasonal, or casual status which caused their exclusion, status
they could just as easily have had whether or not they were
students. Just as significantly, if we are, as my colleagues would
have it, to believe that Cedars' foundation was built on analogy
to cases involving "students," the proper student cases to allude
to would be those which involved (a) students who were regular
full-time or part-time employees, and (b) a request for the
separate representation of these students (since the housestaff
unit is composed exclusively of individuals the majority
denominates students).64
IV. You SCRATCH MY BACK AND I'LL SCRATCH YOURS: THE BOARD
MOVES FROM THE PRIMARY PURPOSE ANALYSIS To A "SERVICE
TEST"
The latter portion of the twentieth century saw the NLRB embrace
employment.
The Board considered the fact that educational processes, such as examinations,
could be the subject of bargaining was against public policy. "We simply do not
view such intrusions into traditional academic freedoms as being in the public
interest." Therefore, the overriding argument for not recognizing medical
residents and interns as not being employees seems to be public policy and the
effects such employee status would have on the public and patient care.
Eva M. Panchyshyn, Medical Resident Unionization: Collective Bargaining By Non-
Employees for Better Patient Care, 9 ALB. L.J. SCd. & TECH. 111, 121 (1998). It is
interesting to note that the Board's recent rejection of these policy arguments is the impetus
behind this comment.
63. St. Clare's Hosp., 229 N.L.R.B. at 1007. (Fanning, dissenting.)
64. Id. (citations omitted).
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Fanning's analysis and expand the NLRA's definition of "employee." The
definition is first broadened in Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB.65 In Sure-Tan, the
Supreme Court ruled that unregistered aliens are still employees under the
act, which the board used later as an imprimatur to define "employee"
broadly.
While Sure-Tan is important as an introduction, Boston Medical
Center Corporation66 serves as the lynchpin case of this time period. As
the Board found itself on the brink of a new millennium, it penned a
monumental decision,67 overturning both Cedars-Sinai and St. Clare's
while finding that medical interns who are also students working towards a
degree are employees within the NLRA's definition. This decision is
essentially a sweeping endorsement of Fanning's dissenting opinions
penned some twenty-five years earlier, affirming his employer-servant
analysis while citing supposed Supreme Court endorsement in NLRB v.
Town and Country Electric, Inc.68
However, emphasis on that decision is misplaced. In Town and
Country, the Court acknowledges that where no replacement definition for
"employee" is provided, the master-servant relationship of the common law
of agency is what Congress envisioned; still, the Court admits that the
Board should be granted "considerable deference" except when it is so
unreasonable it has stepped beyond its bounds.69 The Board instead took to
heart only what they read to be an endorsement of the Fanning view rather
than using the broad deference granted by the Court.
Possibly in an attempt to supplement Fanning's etymological view,
the Board turned to an examination of "ordinary dictionary" 70 definitions,
71 . 72citing the American Heritage Dictionary' and Black's Law Dictionary.
The American Heritage Dictionary defines employee as any "person who
works for another in return for financial or other compensation."7' The
definition in Black's Law Dictionary turns on whether or not services are
provided for compensation and another has control. 74 Confusingly, the
Board found similar notions inherent in the statute's circular language
"[t]he term 'employee' shall include any employee.... ,,T5
65. 467 U.S. 883 (1984).
66. 1999WL 1076118 (Nov. 26, 1999).
67. See Bernhard W. Rohrbacher, supra note 2, at 1849-50 (asserting that TA's "have
so far been denied the status of 'employees"').
68. 516 U.S. 85 (1995).
69. Id. at 94. See also Sure-Tan, Inc., 467 U.S. at 891; NLRB v. Hendricks Cty. Rural
Elec. Membership Corp., 454 U.S. 170, 177-90 (1981).
70. Boston Medical, 330 N.L.R.B. 152, 160 (1999).
71. AMEimCAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY (3d ed. 1992).
72. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990).
73. AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 604 (3d ed. 1992).
74. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 525 (6th ed. 1990).
75. 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1994).
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The Board's explanation of the opinion extends to an earnest attempt
to defend the most predictable and persuasive criticism: that opening the
Pandora's box of student unionization creates critical problems for the
educational process. The Board seemed to realize the tension created by
deciding that courts may pick and choose which areas are educational and
which are economic, what can be subject to the bargaining process and
what cannot.76 And while such a practice is not unheard of in the courts,
7 7
such a blas6 attitude is not a standard to which the Board should strive to
meet.78
Whether or not the Board was correct in its decision, momentum
prevailed and the analysis was predictably extended to cover all graduate,
teaching, and research assistants in the landmark New York University
decision of October 2000.79 That decision essentially embraced the Boston
Medical and Fanning analysis, finding no reason to deny students who are
also employees the right to organize and bargain collectively. The Board
rejected the main policy argument, that academic freedom will be impeded
by the bargaining process, citing the jurisdiction the Board has held for
some time over private universities ° and its history of decision making in
this areas ' as ample reason to rule for the plaintiff graduate assistants. This
holding provides a frustrated university little solace.
Beginning with the foundation that Section 2, subsection 3 of the
NLRA "states that the term 'employee' is meant 'to include any
employee.., unless the Act explicitly states otherwise, ' '8 2 the Board notes
that the Supreme Court subscribes to common law principles of agency 3 in
76. Boston Medical, 330 N.L.R.B. 152, 152 (1999).
77. See Regents of the Univ. of Mich. v. Mich. Employment Relations Comm., 204
N.W.3d 218 (1973).
78. This sort of decision-making is not atypical of the Board's history, and has long
been subject of criticism. As Joan Flynn, NLRB staff counsel, commented:
By... burying its rules under totality-of-the-circumstances tests and mountains
of case law, the Board virtually invites parties to engage in highly disfavored
conduct, and makes the use of prohibitory injunctions highly impracticable ....
[T]he lengthiness of litigation and the weakness of Board remedies guarantee
that the Act's purposes will nonetheless be subverted.
Joan Flynn, The Costs and Benefits of "Hiding the Ball": NLRB Policymaking and the
Failure of Judicial Review, 75 B.U. L. REv. 387, 423-24 (1995).
79. N.Y. Univ. v. NLRB, 165 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1241 (2000).
80. See Cornell Univ., 183 N.L.R.B. 329 (1971) (finding that, since Cornell and
Syracuse Universities engaged in interstate commerce, federal jurisdiction was appropriate).
81. See, e.g., Univ. of Great Falls, 325 N.L.R.B. 83 (1997); Lorreto Heights Coil., 264
N.L.R.B. 1107 (1982), enforced, 742 F.2d 1245 (10th Cir. 1984); C.W. Post Ctr., 189
N.L.R.B. 904 (1971).
82. N.Y. Univ., 332 N.L.R.B. No. 111, Case 2-RC-22082, 2000 NLRB LEXIS 748, *57
(Oct. 31, 2000).
83. Restatement (Second) of Agency, § 220 provides in part:
(1) A servant is a person employed to perform services in the affairs of another
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determining employee status.84
The Board reviewed other cases in which it construed "employee"
widely to effectuate the Act's "stated purpose of encouraging and
protecting the collective bargaining process." 85
Citing Town & Country's common law 6 and dictionary definitions
test,87 the Board rightfully declares that the Supreme Court "has repeatedly
and who with respect to the physical conduct in the performance of the services
is subject to the other's control or right to control.
(2) In determining whether one acting for another is a servant or an independent
contractor, the following matters of fact, among others, are considered:
(a) the extent of control which, by the agreement, the master may exercise
over the details of the work;
(b) whether or not the one employed is engaged in a distinct occupation or
business;
(c) the kind of occupation, with reference to whether, in the locality, the
work is usually done under the direction of the employer or by a specialist
without supervision;
(d) the skill required in the particular occupation;
(e) whether the employer or the workman supplies the instrumentalities,
tools and the place of work for the person doing the work;
(f) the length of time for which the person is employed;
(g) the method of payment whether by the time or by the job;
(h) whether the work is part of the regular business of the employer;
(i) whether the parties believe they are creating the relation of master and
servant; and
(j) whether the principal is or is not in business.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220 (1958).
84. For an example of the Supreme Court's agency analysis, see Cmty. for Creative
Nonviolence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730 (1989); see also Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883
(1984) (noting that § 2(3) of the Act is to be construed widely.).
85. N.Y. Univ., 2000 NLRB LEXIS 748, at *58.
86. The Board notes:
In Town & Country, the Court, using a common law test, reasoned that although
someone may be paid by a Union to organize a company, this individual is still
an "employee" if he or she is working for the Employer for compensation. The
Court stated, "in the past, when Congress has used the term "employee" without
defining it, we have concluded that Congress intended to describe the
conventional master-servant relationship as understood by common-law agency
doctrine."
Id. at *58 (quoting NLRB v. Town & Country Elec., Inc., 516 U.S. 85, 94 (1995)). As the
Court pointed out, there are other examples in which the Board employed a common law
approach to defining "employee." See WBAI Pacifica Foundation, 328 N.L.R.B. 1273
(1999).
87. The Board's language best explains its view:
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noted that the Board's historic reading of the definition of 'employee'
under the Act has been literal and broad."8'8 Finally, the Board explained
that its journey towards accepting graduate students with employment
responsibilities as employees for purposes of the act has come to a close:
Recently, the Board, in Boston Medical Center Corp., overruled
Cedars-Sinai Medical Center and St. Clare's Hospital & Health
Center, and held that the housestaff employed by a hospital are
"employees" within the meaning of Section 2(3) of the Act, even
though at the same time they are employed, they are students
learning their chosen medical craft. After many years of
excluding those interns and residents who otherwise fit the
definition of "employee" under common law because they were
also students, the Board adopted former Member Fanning's view
in his dissent in Cedars-Sinai.89
Clearly, New York University was conceptualized as an opportunity
for the Board to close the book on this matter. As one follows the
intellectual progression summarized above, it becomes obvious that the
Board hopes to prove that the legal progression it made is reasonable and
fundamentally sound.
The Board may have succeeded. While the rejection by both the
Board and the courts of the supposed deference the Board is owed proves
troubling and perplexing, New York University reads as an entirely
reasonable decision. But in completely throwing open the "Pandora's box"
of educational unionization, the Board created a troubling and unfortunate
environment for modem graduate education. And, as the next section will
show, it need not have occurred.
V. A CALL FOR A RETURN TO THE "PRIMARY PURPOSE" TEST: YOU
ARE MORE THAN WHAT You Do
I do not attempt to suggest that the precedents set in Boston Medical,
and especially in New York University, stem from bad law-far from it.
After looking to the definition of "employee" in the American Heritage
Dictionary ("any person who works for another in return for financial or other
compensation") and Black's Law Dictionary ("a person in service of another
under any contract of hire, express or implied, oral or written, where the
employer has the power or right to control and direct the employee in the
material details of how the work is to be performed"), the Town & Country
Court concluded that, "the phrasing of the Act seems to reiterate the breadth of
the ordinary dictionary definition for it says, 'the term "employee" shall include
any employee,"' 28 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1988).
N.Y. Univ., 2000 NLRB LEXIS 748, at *58.
88. Id. at *59.
89. Id. at *62.
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While the lack of deference to Board opinions is troubling, the conclusions
made by the Supreme Court and recently adopted by the Board are logical.
However, the definitional analysis employed by the current Board and
Supreme Court decisions works as much against their conclusions as for
them, providing more than enough impetus for one to embrace a return to
the "primary purpose" test.
The first analytical step is to examine the educational process for the
graduate students in question. The graduate students to whom this decision
speaks most urgently routinely teach undergraduate classes, grade exams,
oversee laboratories, and assist junior students with their studies.90 What
the Board has come to call "services" are in actuality part and parcel to the
graduate student educational process.
Naturally, the Board would disagree with this assertion, and attempted
to head it off at the pass in its criticism of a key anti-unionization argument
used in New York University:
[We disagree with the Employer's argument that graduate
assistant work is primarily educational. [New York University]
attempts to highlight the educational nature of this work by
claiming that graduate assistants perform this work to obtain their
degrees, contrasting the house staff in Boston Medical Center
who already had degrees and were merely receiving advanced
training in their profession. We recognize that working as a
graduate assistant may yield an educational benefit, such as
learning to teach or research. But, surely the house staff work in
Boston Medical Center affords an equal, if not greater,
educational benefit, because that work, in part, provides training
in furtherance of becoming certified in a medical specialty. Even
in those circumstances, however, the Board determined that the
fact that house staff "obtain educational benefits from their
employment" is not inconsistent with employee status.... Nor is
it inconsistent here.91
Unfortunately for our future college students, the Board is simply
wrong in its stubborn de-emphasizing of the importance of the entirety of
the graduate education process.
Putting graduate students in front of a classroom or asking them to
grade papers is a vital step in their education; it is not an ancillary request
of the school. Nor does it create an employer-employee relationship
between a university and its students. In a Ph.D. program, learning to teach
is as important as finding a research focus, growing mold in a petri dish, or
90. See Adelphi Univ., 195 N.L.R.B. 639, 640-41 (1972) for a clear description of the
typically academically-oriented activities in which graduate assistants take part.
91. N.Y. Univ., 2000 NLRB LEXIS 748, at *11-12 (citing Boston Med. Ctr., 330
N.L.R.B. 152 (1999)).
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92defending a dissertation.
This can be proven just as readily as the Board satisfied itself with its
definitions of "employee." 93 That analysis worked from the assumption
that the students are employees; one can just as readily look to another
definition and find equally logical arguments for the opposite conclusion.
Were the Board to think the scenario through to its logical conclusion,
it might have realized that a more pertinent definition for its analysis is that
of a professor. The ultimate goal of many Ph.D. candidates is a
professorship, and one can see the educational value of teaching assistant
duties when the definition of professor is dissected. Take the Merriam-
Webster Dictionary, which defines professor as follows:
Main Entry: PRO.FES.SOR
Pronunciation: pr&-'fe-s&r
Function: noun
Date: 14th century
1 : one that professes, avows, or declares
2 A : a faculty member of the highest academic rank at an institution
of higher education B : a teacher at a university, college, or sometimes
secondary school C : one that teaches or professes special knowledge
of an art, sport, or occupation requiring skill.94
That definition firmly establishes the academic aspirations of these
Ph.D. candidates.
Instead of acknowledging that this definitional information runs
counter to their own, the Board chose to turn a blind eye, thereby declaring
graduate students employees. Decisions become easier when information
to the contrary is ignored.
It is clear that the education required to perform these duties goes
beyond that required to understand the subject matter; experience is
necessary to successfully prepare for the challenges brought by a
professorship.9 5 The educational process provides that experience. Few
92. It is not difficult to conceive of the importance of a doctoral candidate focusing her
research, developing her research skills, and learning to defend her ideas. All three
experiences are intrinsic to an education, not a job. Were such activities on-the-job training
as the Board seems to imply, then a candidate would be working towards a promotion, not a
degree.
93. See, e.g. Boston Med. Ctr., 1999 NLRB LEXIS 821, at *13; N.Y. Univ., 2000
NLRB LEXIS 748, at *58-59.
94. Merriam-Webster Online: The Language Center, available at http://www.merriam-
webster.com (emphasis added). See also THE OxFoRD ENGLISH DICTIONARY vol. 12, 574
(2d ed. 1989) (defining professor as "A public teacher or instructor of the highest rank in a
specific faculty or branch of learning.. .the term Professor came eventually to be confined
or endowed teaching offices, or to the highest class of these...").
95. The same can be said for the lesser title of "instructor," the definition of which
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would argue that an education should end at the classroom door; this is
especially true for graduate students pursuing advanced degrees. Such an
educational process is not employment - the relationship is that of teacher-
student, not employer-employee. The student learns from the teacher not
only the advanced nuances of their field, but also the basic skills needed to
teach those skills to others once they too become professors.96 Introducing
core elements of graduate level education to a bargaining process would
turn the entire educational system on its ear, hindering higher education in
the process.
One can imagine the stress on the foundation of the educational
system when graduate students can join together to eliminate a portion of
their education, with legal sanction. While we would balk at the concept of
a group of high school students refusing to take a final exam, the Board has
done the equivalent for graduate level students.97 Our future college
professors now have the power to forego basic instructions on how to
teach. By allowing these graduate students the right to organize, the power
to control the educational process is transferred from the university
granting the degree to the student receiving it. This transfer would ignore
the decades of knowledge and experience with higher education that
professors and deans have, and consolidate much of the power over critical
decisions into the hands of naive and inexperienced recent college
graduates.
This analysis rings most true for students hoping to attain
professorships, but it need not be limited to such a scenario. It can be
similarly applied to would-be chemists who expect to perform research
experiments their entire lives and do the same at a university, or to a future
astronomer who spends her nights gazing at the heavens through a
telescope and plans to do the same after receiving her doctorate. These
experiences are an important element of an education. Any money
received as compensation is designed to be merely a token, intended to
follows:
Main Entry: IN-STRUC-TOR
Pronunciation: in-'str&k-t&r
Function: noun
Date: 15th century
: one that instructs : TEACHER; especially: a college teacher below professorial
rank.
Merriam-Webster Online: The Language Center, available at http://www.merriam-
webster.com (emphasis added).
96. See generally, Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr., 223 N.L.R.B. 251, 253 (1976) (holding that
interns, residents, and clinical fellows are engaged in graduate educational training and their
status is therefore that of students and not employees).
97. For an example of the potential damage organized teaching assistants will bring,
look at the University of Washington case, where teaching assistants refused to teach
undergraduates or grade papers. See Ray Rivera, supra note 4, at B2.
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assist the graduate student in her academic endeavors as any scholarship
student receives living stipends. By saddling universities with further
economic baggage and by empowering graduate students to control what
they do and do not study, we deny the educational process the freedom it
needs to function effectively. This is sound judicial thinking, but it is not
wise judicial decision-making. Academia, and the world in general, will
suffer the effects of this decision for years to come.
As a sympathizer to the labor movement, I wish to applaud the
Board's progressive stance in expanding the ranks of union membership.
However, that they did so in this case by utilizing a very narrow world
view, without an appreciation for the realities of the education received by
graduate students, is most troubling. Such a haphazard application of the
right to organize will serve as much to embarrass the labor movement in
the twenty-first century as it will to empower it. We can only hope the
Board has occasion to reflect further on its mistake and reverse its decision,
embracing again the logical and well-considered "primary purpose" test. I
am afraid, however, given the circuitous route the Board took to its current
position, that this will not occur any time soon. Still, the decision is recent,
and I hope that academic inquiry will continue and that the Board's
experience will illuminate the extent of its mistake, thereby prompting it to
reconsider its decision.
98. See Cornell Univ., 183 N.L.R.B. 329 (1970). One can imagine the difficulty a
school like the aforementioned DePauw would have were it to treat graduate students as
employees, in addition to the administrative challenges it already faces.
